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NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants (Plaintiffs) seek to recover their rights
in real property and declare null and void, for lack of consideration and duress, an agreement between them and Respondents (Defendants) by which Respondents claim an interest in the property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District court in and for Salt Lake County, Judge
Ernest F. Baldwin sitting without a jury, rendered judgment for
Respondents (Defendants) and awarded them the disputed real property
interests, subject to certain encumbrances.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAR
Appellants

seek reversal of the lower court's judgment

together with certain findings and conclusions on which the judgment
is based, with the resulting effect that Respondents shall have
no interest in the subject real property.

tn the alternative,

Appellants seek a remand and a new trial betore a jury, a right
erroneously denied by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For ease of reference, citations to the trial transcript
will refer to the transcript page numbers as "Tr.
of the record will be cited "R.

".

Other parts

".

Prior to 1973, Appellants (Plaintiffs) JOSEPH S. GASSER
and FREDA N. GASSER, his wife, (for conveniqnce sometimes referred
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to collectively herein as the "GASSERS") owned 42.5% of a mobile
home park in Layton, Davis County, Utah, known as "Hillgate Terrace".
The remaining interests were owned by a Smith Family (15%) and a
Dr. Skankey (42.5%).

The interest was subject to a mortgage in

the amount of $139,000.00 to Dr. Skankey as security for other obligations, and an additional mortgage of $225,000.00 to a group headed
by Dr. Skankey (referred to in the record as the "Skankey group")
as security for further indebtedness of the GASSERS.

The $225,000.00

was secured as well by a mortgage on an apartment house owned by
the GASSERS in Missoula, Montana along with other securities. (See
Tr. 2 9 / 1 0 4 and 122 and Ex. 18-D).

The Hillgate Terrace was subject

also to a first mortgage to another financial institution, not
in issue here. (Tr. 106).
In order to obtain funds with which to pay the Skankey
group and Dr. Skankey, to purchase the interests of Smith and Skankey
in Hillgate Terrace, and to make improvements thereon, Mr. GASSER
began negotiating in early 1973 for a loan of at least $1 million
against Hillgate Terrace.

His preliminary investigations indicated

that the money supply was tight and the loan may have to carry an
additional guarantor.

Mr. GASSER approached Defendant DAVID M.

HORNE who indicated a willingness to guaranty or co-sign the loan.
GASSER and HORNE made a joint application to Prudential Federal
Savings (Ex. 14-D) which was rejcted, and thereafter made application
to American Savings & Loan Association for a loan, concerning
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which the additional relevant events occurred.

Subsequently,

HORNE demanded 50% interest in Hillgate Terrace as a condition of
co-signing on the note and mortgage.

A draft agreement was prepared

by Joseph L. Henriod, Esq. in early April 1973 (Ex. 4-P) incorporating the terms agreed to by HORNE and GASSER.

In substance, if

GASSER could complete the loan in 60 days without the necessity
of HORNE's signature, HORNE would have no interest in the property;
otherwise, HORNE would co-sign the note and mortgage and receive
a 50% interest.
During the time HORNE and GASSER were negotiating with
American Savings & Loan, and GASSER was seeking means of concluding
a loan without HORNE's signature, a foreclosure action was underway
in Montana by which Mr. Henriod, or Montana counsel at his direction,
sought to collect funds due Dr. Skankey or the Skankey Group. (Tr.
287).

Mr. Henriod represented the Skankey group.

Both previously

and subsequently, he represented DAVID M. HORNE on other matters.
(Tr. 319). Although he claimed not to represent HORNE in the negotiations with GASSER here in dispute, he drafted and revised the
agreements in question and discussed all matters pertaining to
HORNE's interests either with GASSER directly or with GASSER's counsel,
James L. Baker, Jr. (Tr. 290 and 301; Ex. 17-D).
GASSER and HORNE subsequently renegotiated their terms
after American Savings & Loan committed a loan which might be resold
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on a 90% participation to Equitable Savings & Loan in Portland,
Oregon.

In substance, HORNE agreed to permit the GASSERS to have

the mortgage and the Hillgate Terrace if the loan could be sold
to Equitable with only the GASSERS signing on the loan.
HORNE demanded his 50% of Hillgate Terrace.

Otherwise,

HORNE would not be

obligated to pay any other consideration for that 50% interest.
During the final week of concluding the American Savings
& Loan deal beginning June 25, 1973, the GASSERS objected to signing
the HORNE Agreement which had been redrafted in several forms by
Mr. Henriod (Exs. 5-P, 6-P and 22-D) because they did not like
the limitations which required selling the loan to Equitable within
30 days as the only condition which would render HORNE ! s signature
unnecessary.

Mr. Henriod advised the GASSERS that if they did not

sign the agreement, he would complete his foreclosure for the
Skankey group.

(Tr. 336). The GASSERS felt they would "lose

everything" by such action, (Tr. 174) and finally, even against the
advice of their own counsel
agreement.

(Tr. 226),they executed the HORNE

That agreement is the principal issue in this appeal,

together with the circumstances inducing execution of the same.
On or about June 29, 197 3, the loan with American Savings
was closed with a special escrow set up through Ralph Marsh, Esq.
of Backman, Backman & Clark.

Out of the proceeds of the loan as

actually closed, the Skankey Group was paid approximately $401,000.00
(Ex. 7-P).

In a simultaneous transaction, the Montana properties

were sold and Dr. Skankey and the Skankey Group paid all monies
due (Ex. 8-P).

Two sets of documents were signed, one consisting of
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a note and trust deed with related document$ signed only by the
GASSERS, the other having a note and trust deed signed by both
the GASSERS and the HORNES. (Tr. 205). The trust deed signed by the
GASSERS was actually recorded on July 2, 1973 and the documents
signed by the HORNES are still in escrow.

Thus, under the operative

documents, the HORNES never did assume liability on any note or
mortgage.

Equitable declined to purchase the loan after it was

closed by American Savings, but as of January 22, 1974, the loan
was sold on a 75% participation basis to Fair West Savings & Loan,
Portland, Oregon.

American Savings had earlier indicated a willing-

ness to grant the GASSERS a loan without the HORNES, at a higher
interest rate (Tr. 124,239), but "backed do^n" from that offer
prior to June 29, 1973 when Mr. Henriod and Mr. HORNE made known
their demands for the 50% interest for HORNE and made it appear
"too messy" for American Savings to deal further with GASSERS on
another basis.

(Tr. 242).

By reason of the duress felt by the GASSERS as well as
the apparent lack of consideration in the HORNE Agreement, Mr.
GASSER initiated this lawsuit to prevent the escrow agent from
recording the deed which would have conveyed the 50% interest to
the HORNES, and to determine.further the rights of the parties.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HORNE AGREEMENT IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
The HORNE Agreement as a written document requires initial
comment because it is manifest in the record in several different
forms.

Exhibit 4-P was the first draft, never executed, but impor-

tant as factual background in showing the state of mind of the
parties and other circumstances while negotiating the subsequent
versions.

Exhibit 4-P did not consider the undisputed second mort-

gage to'Mr. GASSER1s father which is mentioned in handwritten interlineation in two of the executed versions.

It also said nothing

about escrowing any documents, nor did it mention the proposed sale
to Equitable Savings & Loan as later defined.

The record evidences

considerable discussion about the change in Paragraph 3 of Exhibit
4-P by which ". . . i n the event GASSER is successful in removing
HORNE from liability . . . " was changed to use "eliminating" instead of "removing".

Thus the intent of the parties was evidenced

that HORNE may never become liable for the loan.

Consequently,

it would not be necessary to "remove" a liability which did not
exist, but rather to "eliminate" the need for HORNE to become liable.
Exhibits 5-P and 22-D are identical except that 5-P does
not show the signature of Mrs. GASSER.

These versions, like the

others, were prepared by Mr. Plenriod and typed in his office after
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conference with Mr. HORNE and Mr, GASSER.

Efxhibit 6-P, the other

manifestation of the HORNE Agreement, does not refer to the $65,000
second mortgage to Mr. GASSER1s father, but all parties admitted
that no dispute exists with respect thereto. (Tr. 304). It appears
that 6-P was made operative because it shows the acknowledgement of
Ralph Marsh as escrow agent on June 29, 1973 and also evidences
on the first page that it was document #2 on that date, presumably
a convenient reference during the closing.

But 6-P has more critical

differences, as compared with 5-P and 22-D, which relate to the
intent of the parties as well as execution inducement circumstances.
In Paragraph 3 of Exhibit 6-P, the clause " . . . HORNE
shall receive no interest in said property by reason thereof . . ."
appears in context with the sale to Equitable.

In Paragraph 4,

concerning sale by American Savings to no party other than Equitable,
appears the phrase ". . . t o the extent GASSER is able to control
the actions of American Savings and Loan, . . .".

These changes

were inserted at the suggestion of James L. Barker, Jr., counsel for
the GASSERS, in his discussions with Mr. Henriod, who appeared to
be representing HORNE. (Tr. 145-146).

Althpugh Mr. Barker advised

the GASSERS against signing the agreement (Tr. 226), he recognized
the pressures they were -under and thus atteitipted to gain some relief
by not tying the GASSERS to actions of American in marketing the
loan elsewhere, over which they may have no control.

His changes

also emphasize the intent that the HORNES would have no interest
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in the property in the event a sale of the loan with the GASSERS 1
signatures alone was successful.

Exhibit 6-P is the only Agreement

version showing the changes requested by Mr. Barker.
The perspective will be broadened in a later demonstration
that HORNE did not become liable on the note as a matter of fact
(and law) after execution of the HORNE-GASSER Agreement 'and closing
of the loan by GASSER.

We argue here the elementary concept that

the Agreement lacked consideration ab initio.

Of striking signi-

ficance in the Agreement is the fact that HORNE makes no promise
or covenant whatever 1

The last "Whereas" clause recites that

HORNE is willing, under certain conditions, to provide financial
backing for the loan.

That clause does not represent a specific

covenant, although the agreement to perform some unarticulated
act might be inferred from the context and explained by parol
evidence.

Even that inference is questionable when it is remembered

that HORNE joined with GASSER on an earlier application to Prudential (Ex. 14-D), but never did intend to become liable to Prudential. (Tr. 357). Perhaps he intended no liability at American Savings,
either, but in any event, he achieved just that.

Without an express

covenant by HORNE, the consideration recited of "mutual promises and
agreements of the Parties" must be interpreted as showing no considera
tion.

Only GASSER makes promises in the Agreement.

"mutual" promise of HORNE.

There is no

In undisputed testimony, HORNE told
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GASSER that he would not take compensation for signing a note
and mortgage if he could get released within a reasonable time.
(Tr. 112). With that intent, HORNE made no promise even to become
obligated, and in fact, never did.
there is no consideration.

Without mutuality of obligation,

On its very face, therefore, the Agree-

ment is unenforceable and of no effect.
As a result of the foregoing, the lower courtfs Finding
No. 5 (R. 228) is erroneous in finding that HORNE agreed to become
personally liable on the $1,050,000.00 note to American Savings.
Further, Finding No. 15 (R. 230) is erroneous in its statement that
the Agreement was supported by fair and adequate consideration.
This Court, on appeal, must find and conclude that the Agreement
lacked consideration ab initio and did not subsequently develop
any consideration which would support GASSER1s promises.

The lower

court's judgment should be reversed on that ground.
Even if the Court construed HORNE'Is actual signature on
the alternative note as extrinsic evidence to the Agreement supporting
an inference that HORNE promised to become liable, then the Court
must also consider external circumstances concerning whether HORNE
actually became liable.

In the first instance, a lack of promise

created a lack of consideration.

In the second instance, although

a promise may have been inferred, there was a failure of consideration when HORNE did not actually become liable on the operative
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documents.

The lower court's willingness to give effect to a con-

tract which either lacked or failed for consideration, or both,
cannot be upheld.
The Court will observe from the record that the note and
Trust Deed from the GASSERS (without the HORNES1 signatures) was
actually sold to Far West Savings & Loan under a participation by
which American retained 25% and the servicing.(Ex. 1-P, Tr. 246,
251).

After the closing through escrow on June 29, 1973, that

Trust Deed was recorded on July 2, 1973.

The participation agree-

ment between American and Far West (part of Ex. 1-P) clearly evidences
in Paragraph VI that no loan could be sold which was in default.
American represented that the payments were current, but such
could not be so without payments from the borrower.

The record

is clear, however, that HORNE was never asked to pay and never did
pay any portion of the payments, even as of the date of trial 18
months after the sale to Far West.

Also, the participation certi-

ficate clearly indicates that JOSEPH S. GASSER, JR. was the principal
debtor, and no mention is made of HORNE.

At no time did HORNE

attempt to assert that he was liable with GASSER on the note, for
the record is devoid of any suggestion that he contacted American
Savings or Far West after the loan was closed and sold/ to assert
his interest in the property and his liability on the note.

By

his own admission, HORNE never was billed for any payment. (Tr.
361).

GASSER received all the coupon books and arranged to make
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the payments. (Tr. 74). Consequently, HORNE did not consider
himself liable on the note and, in fact, he did not become liable
Without such liability on HORNEfs part, there was abso-

in law.

lutely no consideration for the agreement of the GASSERS to convey
the 50% interest.

HORNE is attempting to obtain an interest for

which he does not pay.
Although some confusion existed during the trial regarding
admission of testimonial evidence concerning sale of the GASSER
loan to Far West, it is clear from the testimony of Mr. Bradshaw,
President of American Savings, that the GASSER note and trust deed
(shown with loan statement signed by the GASSERS only as part of
Exhibit 7-P) were sold to Far West without documents signed by
the HORNES. (Tr. 246). In addition, Exhibit 1-P evidences that
the GASSER note (without the HORNES) was sold to Far West, and
Mr. Nielsen, counsel for HORNE at trial, stipulated that Exhibit
1-P could be admitted as evidence for the facts therein stated.
(Tr. 6) .
The applicable law, viewed against the facts argued above,
supports Appellants1 conclusions.

It is well established that con-

sideration is an essential element of any valid contract and that
a promise which is not supported by consideration is not enforceable.

See Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 535 P.2d 880 (Kan.

1975); Malcoff v. Coyier, 484 P.2d 1053 (Ariz. 1971); Powers Restaurant, Inc. v. Garrison, 465 P.2d 761 (Okjla. 1970); McGrath v.
Electrical Const. Co., 364 P.2d 604, rehearing denied, 370 P.2d
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231 (Ore. 1969); White v. Saby, 260 P.2d 1116 (Mont. 1964).

More-

over, although the general rule is that almost any benefit to a
promisor

or detriment to a promisee, however slight, can consti-

tute consideration, there must be some benefit, profit, or advantage to the promisor or some loss, detriment or inconvenience to
the promisee.

See Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1972);

Kadish v. Kallof, 414 P.2d 193 (Ariz. 1966); Blonder v. Gentile,
309 P.2d 147 (Calif. 1966).
A recent Utah case, Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 11
Utah 2d 433 (1961) adopts the general position followed by other
courts.

The Manwill case involved an action on an alleged agree-

ment to repay to the Plaintiff the amount of payments he had made
on the Defendant's behalf.

The court held that in order for a

contract to be binding, each party must be bound to give legal
consideration to the other by benefitting him or suffering a legal
detriment at his request.
consideration.

Mere moral obligation is not a valid

In the case at bar, HORNE did not suffer a legal

detriment and GASSER did not gain a legal benefit, either in the
language of the Agreement as written or in the actual implementation of the loan from American Savings which was contemplated by
the Agreement.

HORNE did not promise to pay, give up or otherwise

suffer anything under the terms of the Agreement.

When the loan

was finally made and also when it was sold to a participating
institution, only the GASSERS were bound by the documents.

HORNE

-13-

did not promise to become and did not actually become liable on
the note.

GASSER would have no recourse against HORNE for payment

by contribution.

Neither American Savings nor Far West Savings

had any legal right to impose liability on HORNE for payment.
Indeed, they did not intend to rely on HORNE and have not actually
done so; HORNE has not paid and has not been requested t6 pay one
penny toward the loan.

Yet he tries to rely on this lack of considera-

tion as a basis for recovering 50% of a mobile home park!

POINT II
THE HORNE AGREEMENT IS NULL AND VOID AS HAVING BEEN EXECUTED
BY THE GASSERS UNDER DURESS.
This part of Appellants1 argument is both more difficult
to explain and more sensitive.

Without intending to reflect ad-

versely on acts of opposing counsel, we are nevertheless forced
to include a description of the performance of Mr. Henriod as part
of the circumstances constituting duress.

Ordinarily, neither the

court nor opposing counsel would have any right to tell another
attorney whom he must represent.

Yet it is part of Appellants'

claim here that Mr. Henriod either represented the HORNES as their
counsel in the GASSER transactions, or acted in such manner as to
lead the GASSERS and their counsel, Mr. Barker, to believe such
representation existed.

By objective evidence later detailed,

the record supports the proposition that both HORNE and Mr. Henriod
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led the GASSERS to believe Mr, Henriod had authority to bind the
HORNES.

Under the evidence, the HORNES must be so bound by acts

of Mr. Henriod.
The duress which should invalidate the HORNE Agreement
is briefly summarized as follows:
1.

Mr. Henriod, acting on behalf of the HORNES, threat-

ened the GASSERS that if they did not sign the HORNE Agreement,
the Skankey foreclosure on property of the GASSERS would be completed;
2.

Mr. Henriod and HORNE threatened American Savings &

Loan that they must go through with the GASSER-HORNE loan or suffer
litigation at a time when American may have granted a loan with
higher interest rate to the GASSERS alone without the HORNES and without
a pre-committed sale; and
3.

Mr. Henriod had an unconscionable conflict of interest

in representing the Skankey Group and HORNE through

at least part

of the GASSER transactions.
The detailed factual and legal arguments to follow will
amplify Appellants1 contentions that the facts in the record support Appellants'positions as summarized above and do not support
the lower court!s Findings No. 12 (claiming that Mr. Henriod did
not represent HORNE), No. 14 (claiming that Plaintiffs were not
induced, coerced or intimidated) and No. 15 (claiming that Defendants were not guilty of other wrongful or improper conduct). (R.229).
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Subject to later discussions of certain legal and evidentiary points, the detailed evidence concerning duress on the
GASSERS is demonstrated by the following recapitulation:
1.

The so-called Skankey Group was represented by Mr.

Henriod (Tr. 290), but Dr. Skankey personally was represented also
by Richard Harris, Esq. (in Mr. Marsh's escrow office in, the meeting
of June 20, 1973 (Tr. 7 6 ) , and according to Mr. Henriod's testimony.
(Tr. 345).
2.

Early in the HORNE-GASSER negotiations, Mr. HORNE

told Mr. GASSER, in undisputed testimony, that Mr. Henriod was his
attorney. (Tr. 78). Thereafter, Mr. Henriod admittedly prepared
the draft agreement, Exhibit 4-P (Tr. 292) and commenced discussions
with HORNE and GASSER resulting in 5-P, 6-Pjand 22-D (Tr. 86).
Although GASSER and HORNE commenced initial discussions without
the assistance of Mr. Barker for GASSER and Mr. Henriod for HORNE,
it was only natural that the definitive agreements would be prepared
and reviewed by the respective counsel.

HORNE turned to Mr. Henriod

for this purpose because Mr. Henriod had represented him on prior
matters (Tr. 319) and obviously commenced representing him in connection with this lawsuit after it was filed (Tr. 331).
3.

During a meeting at Mr. Henriod's office attended

by HORNE and GASSER on June 27, 1973, HORNE demanded his 50% interest
in Hillgate Terrace under circumstances which caused GASSER to
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walk out of the meeting rather than state what he really felt. (Tr.
84).

Later, Mr. Henriod told GASSER that he should work things out

with HORNE. (Tr. 86). Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 22-D followed those
discussions.
4.

Even though Mr. Barker's position as counsel for

GASSER was known, Mr. Barker permitted GASSER to speak directly
to Mr. Henriod on most occasions without Mr. Barker's intercession
as counsel. (Tr. 103).
5.

The squeeze-play on the GASSERS between Mr. Henriod's

Skankey clients and his HORNE clients began gradually and is demonstrated most aptly by Exhibit 17-D.

On May 7, 1973, Mr. Henriod

wrote Mr. Barker a letter concerning the HORNE-GASSER Agreement
(presumably the draft, Exhibit 4-P) and complained of lack of
communication in working out details before closing the loan.
Mr. Henriod therein stated, "We need to prepare escrow instructions
which are going to meet your approval and your clients
and also mine and my clients

approval.

approval

We also need these agree-

ments circulated to obtain my client's approval."

Notwithstanding

inconsistent use of apostrophes on the word "client", the last
use as "client's" suggests that he is talking about HORNE rather
than the Skankey Group.

Furthermore, Exhibit 18-D, the Skankey

settlement agreement, had been executed some time earlier, and
it was not necessary for Mr. Barker to review that again.

The

inescapable conclusion is that Mr. Henriod, on behalf of his client,
HORNE, was seeking some responses from Mr. Barker relative to the
HORNE-GASSER Agreement.
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6.

Although Mr. Henriod continued to put pressure on

GASSER to pay Skankey and the Skankey Group after November 1972
(Tr. 112-113), yet the communications between GASSER and Mr. Henriod
were somewhat tension-free until June 11, 1973. On that date, Mr.
Henriod summoned GASSER to his office and delivered a letter of
demand (Ex. 16-D) by which the obligations to the Skankey Group
had to be paid by June 25, 1973. (Tr. 121). This demand accelerated
the squeeze-play.
7.

During a conversation between Mr. Barker and Mr.

Henriod after submission of Mr. Henriod1s draft resulting in Exhibit
5-P, on or after June 25, 1973, Mr. Barker told Mr. Henriod that
the agreements were unfair and did not represent what HORNE had
earlier agreed to.

Mr. Henriod responded that his client (HORNE)

had changed his mind.
record.

This testimony remains undisputed in the

These events also form part of the entire context wherein

Mr. Henriod was acting solely for Mr. HORNE's interests in conversations with GASSER and Mr. Barker, in matters which were of no
direct concern to his Skankey clients.

Mr. Henriod would not have

reason to discuss HORNE's matters with Mr. Barker if he were not
purporting to represent HORNE.
8.

When the closing was imminent and the HORNE Agreement

had not yet been finalized as of June 26, 1973, Mr. Henriod contacted
HORNE in San Francisco and arranged for the HORNES and the GASSERS
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to meet the next day to complete the Agreements. (Tr. 301). HORNE
confirmed Mr. Henriodfs testimony in that regard in language which cer
tainly

sounds as if an attorney and his client are conversing:

"Q (By Mr. Halgren) Mr. H o m e , when you were contacted
by Mr. Henriod sometime on the 26th day of June
1973 by telephone do you recall anything that was
discussed between you and Mr. Henriod at that time?
A
Q

Yes.
Would you tell me wnar was said?

A

Mr. Henriod asked me if I was ready to sign the agreement that had been prepared sometime earlier.

Q

And what did you tell him?

A

I told him that it was an entirely different time,
that I didn't know if I was prepared to sign it or
not; that I would be back in Salt Lake the next day
and we would discuss it." (Tr. 359).
9.

In conversation between Mr. Marsh, escrow agent,and Mr.

Henriod during the week of June 25th, Mr. Henriod stated that GASSER
had accused him of a conflict of interest in representing both the
Skankeys and the HORNES.

Mr. Henriodfs comment was:

"I guess I do

have a conflict but we will have to let the chips fall where they
may with respect to that." (Tr. 203-204).
re:

(See later discussion

proffer of proof in connection with this testimony).

Mr. Henriod

did not deny making that statement to Mr. Marsh, although he conveniently couldn't "recall" such statement. (Tr. 352). In testimony
of GASSER which appears embarassing at first glance, but in substance
does not impair his evidence or his legal position, GASSER asked
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HORNE not to tell Mr. Henriod of the value of the mobile home park
as demonstrated by an appraisal of Mr. Kiepe (Tr. 115). GASSER
felt keenly the conflict which Mr. Henriod didn't want to face (or
escape) and believed that the value of the park necessary for the
loan (and to satisfy HORNE if he should join the loan) was so high
that the Skankey agreement might be upset if Mr. Henriod'realized
the full value.

HORNE, for selfish interests, was willing to with-

hold that information from his own attorney.
10.

The squeeze-play on the GASSERS became downright

difficult when the threats from Mr. Henriod were intensified.

When

GASSER asked for another weekend after June 29, 1973 to think about
HORNEfs demands for 50% and the imminent closing of the loan, Mr.
Henriod told him, "No, you have no more time, if you don't sign
today my clients will foreclose and there will be nothing left of
the situation." (Tr. 88 and 147). Mrs. GASSER, recalling similar
threats from Mr. Henriod, characterized them as leading her to
believe that they would "lose everything" by Mr. Henriod's foreclosure. (Tr. 174). She specified that although Mr. Henriod was
making the threats, they were really for HORNEfs benefit. (Tr. 187).
Although Mr. Henriod denied threatening that the GASSERS
"would lose everything" (Tr. 306), which was probably the GASSERS'
characterization of the import of his threats, Mr. Henriod clearly
stated his threats in response to questions by Mr. Halgren:
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"Q

A

What I'm talking about, the critical time now when
he has either got to fish or cut bait, he either
has to get this loan finalized or he loses the
whole thing.
I think in the 28th — on the 28th, I think I said
'If you don't come up with the money by the 28th or
29th, now, that it will be necessary for me to foreclose. ' I had already given the written notice to
that effect on the 11th.
* * *

Q

Well, you were threatening to foreclose.

A

Yes, I was threatening to foreclose but that was
only part of his assets." (Tr. 336-337).
The nature of the foreclosure is also clarified by Mr.

Henriod, with emphasis showing that his threats were not mere idle
talk:
"Q
A

(By Mr. Nielsen)
was done?

Will you state when and what

About March of 197 3 we commenced an action against
Mr. Gasser and in the State of Montana to foreclose
the interest that had been assigned to secure the
payment of the $225,000. Also prepared pleadings
which were not filed to foreclose the interest in
the Layton trailer park." (Tr. 337).
It is evident that Mr. Henriod meant business.

And he

was thus in a strong position to tell the GASSERS that they must
go along with the HORNE demands or his already-commenced foreclosure
in Montana would be completed and his about-to-be-commenced foreclosure in Utah would be implemented.
11.

It is incongruent for

Mr. Henriod to be involved

in the squeeze-play on the GASSERS as he otherwise admitted that he
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didn't really care where the money for the Skankey Group came from.
In the same regard, he Was not sufficiently concerned about the
appraisal on the park to ask Home for a copy of the appraisal.
(Tr. 317). His reasons:
"Q

A

Did you have any particular reason why you were
not concerned with the appraised value of this
property?
My concern was getting the $468 or $470,000, plus
the $225 for my clients, wherever Mr. Gasser got
his money was of no concern to me except that he
got it and paid it." (Tr. 318).
12.

The threats constituting duress on the GASSERS as-

sumed a- different but sharper focus when both Mr. Henriod and
HQRNE put pressures on American Savings & Loan relative to the
GASSER matter.

When GASSER was seeking to ^restructure the loan

without any need of HORNEfs signature, he had preliminary indications
from American Savings that an interest rate of 9% may be hard to sell
with the GASSERS alone on the documents, but with a 10% rate (which
GASSER agreed to pay) the loan would be more marketable. (Tr. 124).
The question of using a higher rate loan with the GASSERS (but not
the HORNES) is connected closely with the demands made by HORNE
and Mr. Henriod that American Savings go along with them and not
negotiate further with the GASSERS.

The import of the evidence

is that American Savings was willing to make a loan on an increased
rate to the GASSERS alone without the HORNES and without a precommitted sale to another financial institution.

No written com-

mitment to that effect was ever finalized, however, by reason of
the pressures from HORNE and Mr. Henriod.
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During the testimony of Mr. Bradshaw, President of American Savings
& Loan, the following dialogue occurred:
"Q

(By Mr. Halgren) Well, was there any discussion
relative to a change in the rate of interest
relative to this loan?

A

There was discussion about a change in the rate
of interest.

Q

Was the change up or down"
—

(Objection by the Court to leading question)

—

Q

All right, How was the change?

A

It was to be changed upward so the loan could be sold.

Q'

And what inportance was that that the loan could
be sold?

A

Well, there was a lot more people in the market
when the rate is high and they overlook certain
things when it's a profitable loan.

Q

What was Mr. Gasser's position with regards to any
increase in the loan rate?

A

He was willing to have it increased."

(Tr. 240)

Further testimony of Mr. Bradshaw suggested the pressures his institution felt:
"Q

A

(By Mr. Halgren) Do you know of any thing that
arose in the business of American Savings that
caused American Savings and Loan not to increase
the loan rate to ten percent?
Well, as previously stated it got to be a hassle
and got to be involved with two sides, I honestly
don't think I was ever threatened. You said threatened, I don't think I was ever threatened or anything
like that, but it got uncomfortable to the point
where it was kind of messy. We talked it over with
our counsel, he advised us not to raise it, not to
be involved."
(Tr. 241).
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"Q

(By Mr. Halgren) Did you have any conversation
with either Mr. Home or Mr. Henriod relative to
their position on an increase in the loan rate.

A

I can't remember the specific exact conversation,no,
I can't, but I know that gist of it, that we learned
both sides and the problems, and that's why we
backed down.

Q

So because of that you kept Mr. Dave Home's name
on the loan application and included him as a party
in the transaction, is that correct?

A

I think he isn't a party to the transaction, is he?"
(Tr. 242) .
The first statements above evidence that American Savings

would have gone forward with the GASSERS on a loan with increased
rate, without the HORNES, if American Savings hadn't backed down.
After learning the problems concerning Mr. HORNE and Mr. Henriod,
however, American Savings backed down.

Even without strong threats

from them, it is obvious that American Savings terminated its further
discussions with the GASSERS as a result of the HORNE-Henriod
pressures.

The trial judge characterized these activities as

"Interfering with a contractual relationship" (Tr. 238) and decided
that such activities may give rise to a tort| liability but should
not be used to declare the agreement null and void.

Appellants

here urge that such "interference" is part of the duress on the
GASSERS which should properly be used as a basis for invalidating
the HORNE Agreement.

Mr. Bradshaw's last answer quoted above

evidences that HORNE was not on the operative documents, and he
wondered why Mr. Halgren described HORNE as a "party" to the
transactions.
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During an earlier dialogue as part of Mr. Bradshaw's
testimony, the court erroneously refused to allow Mr. Halgren
to use Mr. Bradshaw's deposition as a means of refreshing recollection and clarifying matters on which the witness was unclear
by the time of trial.

(See later discussion of the legal points

concerning use of depositions).

The depositions should have been

used as an aid to the court in undeirstanding the full import of
Mr. Bradshaw's testimony.

The deposition testimony of Mr. Howard

C. Bradshaw, under date of October 9, 1973, clearly spells out
both the interest rate consideration and the pressures from HORNE
or Mr. Henriod, under the interrogation by HORNE's counsel, Mr.
Cook, then affiliated with Mr. Henriod's office:
"Q

(By Mr. Cook) Would you state in a general way
what the loan market was doing between February of
'73 and July of '73 with respect to loans of this
nature regarding interest rates and salability of
loans of this size? Did that trigger the right
things?

A

The loans, of course, were increasing, drastically
increasing.

Q

Interest rates?

A

Interest rates. And the loan became unsalable and
we asked Mr. Gasser if he would increase the loan
so it could be sold. And this benefits me and it
evidently benefited him, too, that he didn't have
to—he thought maybe he wouldn't have to work with
Mr. H o m e so he was immediately agreeable so that
I could get it up to a rate where I could sell it
and he could live without Dave Home.
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Q

Now, let's see, the original rate was nine percent
as of February 21, 1973, and so to put this thing
in a time frame, at what point were you having conversations with Mr. Gasser about increasing that
to ten?

A

I'm not sure of the dates.
two after that date.

Q

March, April?

A

Yes, I think so.

Q

And you say he was agreeable to raising the rate
of interest?

A

Yes.

Q

Then was something done to raise the rate of interest or to attempt to get a commitment to purchase
that?

A

Yes. The market at that
sold at the ten percent,
in this big dog fight so
know how we could change

Q

Backed off from selling it?

A

No. Backed off—I haven't anything to sell until
I can get a new note and mortgage signed up, you
see, and I'd have to negotiate a new note and mortgage. At this time this thing kind of exploded or
we could see it building up so our attorney, Ed
Clyde, said, 'Let's not mess with it.'

Q

In terms of —

A

Changing the rate.

Q

No.

A

Okav.

Q

You were saying to Gasser: 'Would you agree to a
higher rate of interest,' and he was saying, 'Yes'?

I'm sure a month or

He was agreeable.

time it could have been
but we didn't want to get
we backed off. I don't
it.

Do you understand that?

Well—
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I will. And if there had been—if that's all there
were to it, I'm sure this loan today would have
been sold, the new note would have been made at ten
percent and recorded, and so on and so forth, and
the loan could have been sold and been done with.
But in the meantime, Dave Home called up or Joe
Henriod or somebody and said,'Look, we're in the
middle of this thing. We have rights, and you better
not do this.' And I reported this to our attorney
on the board of directors and he said, 'Forget it,
don't mess with it,it's too messy.1

Q

You mean rights in the loan commitment at the lesser
rate or whatever?

A

Yes. He said leave it alone. Let's let them fight
it out and we'll go from there." (pp. 22-24).
13.

Exhibit 8-P is a set of escrow instructions prepared

by Mr. Henriod in connection with the loan closing at American
Savings.

Most of that document consists of instructions concerning

handling of funds and instruments relating to Dr. Skankey and the
Skankey Group, and Mr. Henriod expressly states therein that he is
attorney for them.

However, Mr. Henriod also provided instructions

for the benefit of the HORNES as if he were also acting on their
behalf.

Paragraph III details handling of documents for the HORNES

and relating to their interests.

The Addendum to Escrow Instructions,

part of Exhibit 8-P, slightly revises the instructions for the
benefit of the HORNES by advising the escrow agent:
" . . . you are further instructed to hold the
Deed from Gasser and Freda to David M. Home and Jeanne
M. Home and to record said Deed only in the event
American Savings & Loan Association requests you to do

-27-

Such instructions relate only to the interests of the HORNES and
were not a necessary part of the Skankey Group instructions. Appellants strongly assert that Mr. Henriod was knowingly acting as
counsel for the HORNES in preparation of escrow documents for the
loan closing and that his position as counsel for them and as
counsel for the Skankey Group and Dr. Skankey provided an opportunity
to make demands on the GASSERS which constituted duress.
When the foregoing facts are viewed against the law pertaining to business duress, the Court must concur with Appellants1
positions herein stated.

This Court has clearly stated the law

regarding business or economic duress in prior decisions.

In Fox

v, Piercey, 119 Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763 (1951), the court reversed
the lower court's findings of duress and determined that no duress
existed in that particular case.

However, after an historical

review of the developments of the law pertaining to duress, the
governing propositions of law were announced:
"To summarize, then, there have been four distinct
phases in the development of the law regarding duress:
1.

The ancient rule limiting it to certain specified acts;
i

2.

The enlargement to include any threats, but
requiring the 'brave man' test;

3.

The relaxing of this rule to apply the 'man
of ordinary firmness1 test; and

4.

The modern rule that any wrongful act or threat
which actually puts the victim in such fear as
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to compel him to act against his will constitutes duress.
We approve this modern rule."•*•* * (227 P.2d at 766).
The court in Fox thereafter discussed the difficulties
of subjective tests for determining duress and the desirability
that an objective standard be used.

Describing the rule of law

as "modern and liberal", the court nevertheless stated that the act
or threat constituting duress must be wrongful, and approvingly
quoted the Restatement of the Law of Contracts:
"Acts or threats cannot constitute duress unless
they are wrongful, even though they exert such pressure
as' to preclude the exercise of free judgment. But acts
may be wrongful within the meaning of this rule though
they are not criminal or tortious or in violation of
a contractual duty * * * * 227 P.2d at 766. [Emphasis
added].
The applicable law was further discussed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Reliable Fruniture Company v. Fidelity & Guaranty
Insurance Underwriters, Inc./ 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965).
In a suit against an insurance company for losses covered by a business interruption policy, plaintiff claimed fraud and duress because
settlement of one claim could not be effected without the insured's
agreeing to settlement of a claim under another policy for an
objectionably low amount.

This court reversed and remanded for

trial the lower courtfs summary judgment for the insurer.
court stated:

The
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"In determining whether the plaintiff is entitled
to redress, it is not essential that his contentions
of fraud and duress be considered separately. They can
and should be considered on the basis that he contends
they existed, intermingled together. *** If we accept
the facts as plaintiff contends them to be, as we are
obliged to do on this review, we must assume not only
that the plaintiff was in economic distress, but that
defendant knew this and took advantage of him by falsely
representing that money belonging to the plaintiff could
not be delivered to him, and wrongfully refusing to deliver it unelss plaintiff would also accept the proffered settlement on defendant's policy, which resulted
in compelling plaintiff to accept the latter settlement
against his will . . . . " 398 P.2d at 687.
The foregoing statement from the court gives rise to
some compelling inferences regarding the facts of the case at Bar.
The Reliable case was reviewed again after trial and reported at 24 Utah 2d 93, 466 P.2d 368 (1970).
firmed the judgment favoring defendant.

There the court af-

The facts did not support

the claimed duress because plaintiff obtained one check and cashed
it and had nine days with the other (disputed) check before cashing
it, thus leading the court to conclude that whatever coercion may
have existed to compel acceptance of the offer ceased to exist
before cashing the second check.

But the principles of law regarding

duress were not changed by the court.

Appellants here submit that

the duress from Mr. Henriod on behalf of HORNE continued right down
to the closing of the American Savings transaction late on June 29,
1973.
Other courts have found duress, as a matter of fact, and
have applied similar principles of law with additional nuances of
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analysis.

In Terrel v. Duke

City Lumber Company, Inc., 86 N.M.

405, 524 P.2d 1021 (1974), the court used the terminology "economic
compulsion" rather than "duress" and dealt with the subject under
classical tort theory.

The facts are lengthy and difficult to review,

but the court's decision has merit in its legal reasoning and the
fact that duress was found to exist sufficient to affirm a judgment
for damages.

Using the normal elements of a tort, including a

duty of care, a breach of that duty, causation and damages, we translate that court's reasoning into the facts at Bar as follows:

(1) Duty of Care:

Mr. Henriod and HORNE had the superior

bargaining position as the sole effective source of something needed
by the GASSERS (the loan) to avoid a severe economic loss.

Thus,

they had the duty to use that position reasonably to assure the
weaker parties (the GASSERS) a reasonable choice of alternatives.
(2) Breach of Duty:

The straightforward threat to fore-

close on all of the GASSERS1 property if they did not sign the
HORNE Agreement represented an unreasonable use of a superior
bargaining position, especially where GASSER might have obtained
a loan at higher rate without the HORNES and where ultimately the
subject loan was closed at American Savings, who sold it to another
investor, without a higher rate and without the necessity of the
HORNES1 signatures.
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(3) Causation:

The direct and proximate cause of the

GASSERS1 execution of the HORNE Agreement ar^d closing the subject
j

loan with an alternative set of documents was the threats of HORNE
and Mr. Henriod regarding foreclosure. As the GASSERS told Mr.
Marsh, they were "forced" to go through with the loan and the
HORNE Agreement. (Tr. 214).
(4) Damages:

Although money damages are not sought by

the GASSERS here, suffering the loss to the HORNES of 50% of a
mobile home park worth $1,688,000.00 (Ex. 21-P), and subject to
mortgages of about $1,200,000.00 in the aggregate, without receiving compensation therefor, constitutes serious economic deprivation
to the GASSERS.
The Terrel case analysis is not dissimilar to the Utah
Court's reasoning in Fox and Reliable, supra.

The objective stand-

ards by which this court judges wrongful conduct, i.e., conduct of
such nature and under such circumstances as to control the will,
achieves the same result as describing the wrongful conduct in terms
of duty, breach and causation.

Whichever words are used to describe

the wrong, HORNE's actions, through Mr. Henziod

, constitute inter-

ference with the free right to seal a new contract with American
Savings.

As the lower court suggested (Tr. 239) the "contractual

interference" must be viewed as a breach of duty resulting in a
void agreement between the HORNES and the GASSERS.
A different semantic gloss on the same theme is seen
in Dittbrenner v. Myerson 167 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1946).

There duress

sufficient to invalidate a contract was fouhd, and the court reversed
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and remanded a judgment for defendant in a case whereby plaintiff
alleged duress in sale of real estate through defendant.
stated, inter alia:

The court

"Under the circumstances of the parties here,

as established without contradiction, actual misrepresentations
were not necessary in order to establish constructive fraud."
(167 P.2d at 20).

The inequality in the Dittbrenner case was one

of experience differential between the parties.
in this

The inequality

case is one of financial, or control of the means of ob-

taining financial relief.

While Appellants here have never claimed

actual and deliberate misrepresentations by HORNE or Mr. Henriod,
under the rule of Dittbrenner, wrongful conduct can be inferred
if the result of threats is duress leading to involuntary actions.
It is important to observe that the means of economic
duress suffered by the GASSERS here was not just a statement of
the rights of Mr. Henriod!s other clients to resort to judicial
means of collecting matured debts.
don't pay, I111 foreclose".

This is not

merely "If you

Such threat to collect by lawful means

a just debt due would not constitute actionable duress.
involves facts far beyond such ordinary conduct.
an attorney who "held all the aces".
and the Skankey Group.

The case

Here we witness

He represented Dr. Skankey

If he did not represent HORNE (and we

submit he did), he placed himself in a position to influence HORNE
and control events bearing on HORNEfs interests (Ex. 8-P, for
example).

Thus, by demanding rightful relief for one group through
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a wrongful demand that the GASSERS sign the HORNE Agreement, he
utilized unfairly a superior bargaining position as the HORNES'
de facto representative, to coerce the GASSERS1 conduct for the
HORNES1 benefit.

Moreover, the wrongful conduct, if this court

were to condone it, would result in a $300,000.00 windfall to the
HORNES for which they neither paid consideration nor suffered
any detriment.

The flagrant unfairness of the proposition is

revolting to our sense of justice.
Accordingly, it is submitted that Appellants have demonstrated the legal and factual grounds on which the court should,
and must, reverse the judgment.
Having discussed the operative fafcts and the governing
law concerning duress, Appellants now provide a brief discussion
concerning certain evidentiary points mentioned earlier.

The first

concerns the use of the deposition of Mr. Bradshaw, which was published without objection during trial. (Tr. 232). When Mr. Bradshaw did not respond to Mr. Halgren's questions at trial with the
same clarity as shown by his deposition, counsel attempted to permit
Mr. Bradshaw to refresh his recollection from page 23 of his October 1973 deposition.

In response to objections, the court held

that it was not proper to hand the deposition to the witness and
let him read it.

After counsel attempted to read parts of the

deposition into the record, the court sustained an objection to
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that procedure.

In such rulings, the court erred.

The deposition

should have been used either to refresh the recollection of the
witness or, if the memory remained unrefreshed, to constitute
substantive evidence.

Rule 63(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

provides:
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence
and inadmissible except:
(1) a prior statement of a witness, if the judge finds
that the witness had an adequate opportunity to perceive
the event or condition which his statement narrates,
describes or explains, provided that (a) it is inconsistent with his present testimony, or (b) it contains
otherwise admissible facts which the witness denies having
stated or has forgotten since making the statement, or
(c) it will support testimony made by the witness in
the present case when such testimony has been challenged;"
[Emphasis added].
The testimony proffered by Mr. Bradshaw's deposition,
quoted at length in the factual discussion paragraph numbered 12
above, was essential as part of the evidence demonstrating the wrongful conduct of Mr. Henriod for his client HORNE under the rules
announced in Fox v. Piercey, supra.

Such relevant and admissible

evidence should not have been excluded by the trial judge and is
susceptible of consideration by this court on appeal.

Rule 63(3)

of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly allows the use of depositions
as an exception to the hearsay rule under certain conditions,
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including the circumstances where the adverse party was present
and cross-examined in the prior deposition testimony.
Further confirming Appellants1 position is Rule 5 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, which expressly permits the setting aside
of a verdict or finding when the excluded evidence would probably
have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different
verdict or finding.

Mr. Bradshaw's testimony about pressure from

HORNE and/or Mr. Henriod and the resulting "backing down" of American
Savings from other negotiations with the GASSERS unequivocally
supports the wrongfulness of Respondents1 actions and the consequent necessity to reverse the lower court's findings and judgment.
Another evidentiary matter having great significance and
adding to the grounds for believing the judgment would be altered
but for evidence wrongfully excluded is the proffer of proof through
Mr. Ralph Marsh.

When Mr. Halgren asked Mr. Marsh about a conversa-

tion he had with Mr. Henriod, the court sustained an objection on
the basis that it was hearsay as to HORNE. (Tr. 203). In a proffer
of proof, Mr. Halgren elicited from Mr. Marsh testimony concerning
the conflict of interest to which Mr. Henriod admitted. (Tr. 203204).

When Mr. Halgren asked for a ruling on his proffer, the

court replied, "You may proceed back on regular". (Tr. 204). This
statement of the court leaves unclear whether the proffered testimony was admitted or stricken.

If the testimony was admitted,
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then it stands as substantive evidence against the Respondents and
their counsel.

If stricken, such was wrongful, for the testimony

is clearly admissible under Rule 5 and Rule 63(1) of the Rules of
Evidence, quoted above.

In that event, Mr. Marsh's hearsay testi-

mony at trial relates to the prior statements of Mr. Henriod as
a witness, which are admissible as inconsistent with his testimony
at trial.

POINT III
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO OUTRIGHT REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT,
APPELLANTS SEEK REMAND FOR A TRIAL BY JURY WHICH WAS
WRONGFULLY DENIED.
During pendency of the case below, counsel for Defendants
requested a non-jury trial as of February 22, 1974. (R. 132). The
case was set for trial October 11, 1974 and continued to October 15,
1974 (R. 156). Prior to the trial setting, Mr. Halgren, then
counsel for Plaintiffs, paid the $15.00 jury fee on September 23,
1974.

The case was then continued again to February 5, 1975.

(R. 155). Although the notices of continuance do not clearly
state, the circumstances clearly indicate that the parties expected
a jury trial.

On February 3, 1975, counsel for Defendants filed

a motion to strike the case from the jury calendar (R. 214). That
motion was granted by order of February 10, 1975 (R. 220) without
designation of reasons for such order.

The case was continued
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from February 5, 1975 to February 24, 1975 (R. 219) and again
to June 25, 1975 (R. 222). Trial commenced before Judge Baldwin
June 26, 1975. (R. 261).
The possible grounds for denial of the jury trial, based
on the motion to strike, are discussed as follows:
1.

"No demand for a jury has been made as required by

Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice for the Third Judicial District
Court."

This ground was not well taken.

Rule 15 provides for

jury trial upon filing of a written demand and the payment of the
required statutory fee, and the demand and fee must be filed at
least ten (10) days prior to trial.

Payment of the jury fee on

September 23, 1974 with trial set for October 11, 1974, and knowledge by Defendants1 counsel, constitutes sufficient compliance
with that rule.

The case was actually set by the clerk on the jury

calendar prior to the motion of Defendants, and it is obvious that
Defendants1 counsel had notice of payment of the jury fee, as a
result of which the court is entitled to assume that a demand
was made (but not in the record) or that counsel was nevertheless
given notice which would be a substitute for the written demand.
2.

"Failure of the Plaintiffs to comply with the provi-

sions of Rule 38(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."

That Rule

preserves the right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or as given by statute, and permits a party to demand a trial
by jury by paying the statutory fee and serving upon the other
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parties a demand therefor in writing.

The rule was complied with

in the same manner as Rule 15 of the Third District Court, discussed
above.
3.

"Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial under

the constitution and the statutes of the State of Utah, particularly
Article 8, Section 9, Constitution of the State of Utah, and Section
78-21-1, UCA, 1953, as amended."

The statutory provision cited

preserves the right to trial by jury, "in actions for the recovery
of specific real or personal property, with or without damages..."
(Sec. 78-21-1).

Where the GASSERS seek to recover from the HORNES

the 50% interest in Hillgate Terrace claimed by the HORNES and
embodied in an unrecorded deed, such action lis for the recovery
of specific real property as contemplated by that statute.

Thus,

the GASSERS were entitled to a trial by jury.
The constitutional provision cited does not impair the
right to jury trial.

Article 8(VIII), Section 9 actually deals

with appeals, and deals with cases in equity or at law.

It seems

to be the position of Defendants that the complaint seeks equitable,
not legal relief, and thus a trial by jury is improper.

Yet it is

painfully evident from the matters heretofore argued in this brief
that substantial questions of fact were raised by the pleadings and
the evidence.

The complaint seeks a restraining order and a decree

adjudicating that the HORNE Agreement is null and void. (R. 2 ) .
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The counterclaim seeks damages plus specitic performance and restraining orders. (R.10)

A trial concerning rights under a disputed

agreement (lack of consideration and duress) and the counterclaim
for damages raises factual issues within the province of a jury.
A jury can decide issues of fact even in equity cases. And this
court can review both fact and law in such cases.

Section 78-2-2,

UCA, 1953, as amended.

CONCLUSION
Appellants submit that this court should reverse the
judgment of the lower court and order judgment for Appellants
on the grounds:
1.

This court has the power on appeal to review the trial

judge's findings and substitute its own, where the evidence would
support different findings.
in the brief.

It is so fundamental that extensive citations are

not necessary.
2.

This proposition has not been argued

See Rule 7(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Agreement between the GASSERS and the HORNES

(Ex. 6-P) is null and void for lack of consideration.
3.

The Agreement between the GASSERS and the HORNES

is of no effect because execution thereof by the GASSERS was induced
by the threats and other circumstances con^tituing business or
economic duress.

Such duress deprived the GASSERS of visible alter-

native methods of refinancing the subject mobile home park or otherwise obtaining financial relief.

As a result, execution of the

Agreement by the GASSERS was not voluntary.
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4.

The HORNBS are not entitled to receive a 50% interest

in the mobile home park without consideration, as a matter of law
or equity.
Alternatively,

Appellants seek remand for jury trial

which was erroneously denied.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

BY

S£^^.^&

Don B. Allen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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